Planning an Affordable, Resilient, and Sustainable Electric Grid in North Carolina 2nd Stakeholder Meeting

December 3, 2020 12:30-4:30*

Following slides contain presentations given by :


- Sushma Masemore, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, State Energy Director, NC Department of Environmental Quality
- Robert Cox, Associate Director, UNC Charlotte EPIC

*Event Agenda is linked HERE

Frequency of Billion-Dollar Disaster Events in the U.S.

1980-2020 Year-to-Date United States Billion-Dollar Disaster Event Frequency (CPI-Adjusted)

Event statistics are added according to the date on which they ended.




Statistics valid as of October 7, 2020.

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, <u>https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/</u>

Hurricane Florence Impacts





Distribution Summary

Wholesale PODs

48

Restored	Events	Outages
NC	22,604	1,643,762
SC	3,806	177,984
Total	26,410	1,821,746
DEC	5,569	387,791
DEP	21,878	1,448,718
Total	27,447	1,836,509

- Florence was the largest mobilization in Duke Energy storm history.
- Flooding and wind damage were unprecedented than any storm to hit Duke Energy. •
- 9 substations flooded •



NC Climate Science Report

North Carolina Climate Science Report



Historical Changes

Projections for NC

Global State of the

Science


"Large changes in North Carolina's climate

— much larger than at any time in the state's history —

are *very likely* by the end of this century under both the lower and higher scenarios."

Very likely 9

90–100% probability of outcome



Source: North Carolina Climate Science Report, https://ncics.org/nccsr

https://statesummaries.ncics.org/

North Carolina Resilience Plan



North Carolina

Climate Risk Assessment and Resilience Plan

Impacts, Vulnerability, Risks, and Preliminary Actions

A Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing North Carolina's Vulnerability to Climate Change


June 2020






https://deq.nc.gov/energy-climate/climate-change/nc-climate-change-interagencycouncil/climate-change-clean-energy-17

Hazards Affecting the Energy System



Source: North Carolina Climate Science Report, https://ncics.org/nccsr

North Carolina Clean Energy Plan Focus on Resilience



https://deq.nc.gov/energy-climate/climate-change/nc-climate-changeinteragency-council/climate-change-clean-energy-16 Key Recommendation:


Modernize the grid to support clean energy resource adoption, <u>resilience</u>, and other public interest outcomes.

- Utilities to develop projects focused on DERs, community solutions, and microgrids at state facilities and critical infrastructure locations to enhance resilience.
- Coordinate resilience planning with disaster recovery operations center and require NC Emergency Management's Recovery Support Functions to address cybersecurity concerns in conjunction with energy resiliency issues.
- Develop a method to quantify the human costs of power outages, and integrate these costs when evaluating grid modernization plan components related to resiliency.

Planning an Affordable, Resilient, and Sustainable Grid for North Carolina

Overview: Funded by State Energy Program, Department of Environmental Quality under a U. S. DOE grant	Partners: University of North Carolina at Charlotte, EPIC, North Carolina State University's Solar Energy Center, and Duke Energy				
Project Goals:			Impact:		
 Conduct a power-system assess storm impacts of scenarios, including a ba and advanced scenario for DERs. Produce a cost-benefit an implementing each of thr 	three (3) seline, improved, or deployment of nalysis of		The project will inform the development of new metrics (e.g., economic losses experienced by customers from outages due to hurricanes) to help the state, utilities, and stakeholders evaluate resiliency options.		
 Convene a comprehensive engagement process to i energy planning process 	mprove state				

Framework for Energy System Resiliency Planning



Resilience Analysis Process (Sandia National Laboratory)

Risk Based Framework


- Walks through defining:
 - hazards,
 - consequences, and
 - goals.

Valuing Resiliency

Consequence Category	Resilience Metric				
Direct					
Electrical service	 Cumulative customer hours of outages Cumulative customer energy demand not served Average number (or percentage) of customers experience an outage during a specified time period 				
Critical electrical service	 Cumulative customer hours of outages Cumulative customer energy demand not served Average number (or percentage) of critical loads that experience an outage 				
Restoration	Time to recovery Cost to recovery				
Monetary	 Loss of utility revenue Cost of grid damages (e.g., repair or replace lines, transformers) Cost of recovery Avoided outage cost 				
Indirect					
Community function	 Critical services without power (hospitals, fire stations, police stations) Critical services without power for more and N hours (e.g., N>hours or backup fuel requirement) 				
Monetary	 Loss of assets and perishables Business interruption costs Impact on Gross Municipal Product, Gross Regional Product 				
Other Critical Assets	 Key production facilities without power Key military facilities without power 				


Different ways energy resilience metrics can be used.

- 1. Build resilience through the modernization of the energy supply and delivery infrastructure.
 - Utilities, regulators, policy makers, energy planners, and emergency planners can use metrics to quantify human and economic costs of power outages and make investment decisions related to energy infrastructure planning and operations.
- Serve as a performance incentive metrics to: (1) incentivize the delivery of utility performance targets or (2) track which metric is useful in measuring a defined resiliency outcome.
- 3. Inform integrated system planning processes, particularly distribution system planning options



Coastal Workshop

NC Resilience Plan: Path Forward





PARSG Project Review: 12/3/2020



Robert Cox

December 3, 2020

Agenda

- 12:50 Project Review
- 1:50 Breakout Session Overview
- 2:00 Breakout Session 1
- 2:45 Stretch Break
- 3:00 Breakout Group Report Out
- 3:45 Breakout Session 2
- 4:15 Wrap-up & Next Steps



Today's Stakeholder Session

- Goals:
 - Present current project status & approach
 - Meet in small groups to discuss community goals
- Four groups identified:
 - Asheville / Henderson (Mountains)
 - New Bern (Coastal)
 - Triad
 - Large urban center





Project Background

- U.S. Dept. of Energy, State Energy Program Award
 - 2-year project began in June 2019
- Building on & contributing to resilience related efforts in NC & U.S.
 - 2023 Duke Energy (DE) Integrated Resource Plan, DE Grid Improvement Plan;
 - NCDEQ Clean Energy Plan & 2023 NC Hazard Mitigation Plan,
 - NARUC, NASEO, U.S. DOE Comprehensive Electricity Planning Task Force (through Feb 2021).
- Team












Project Overview (As Proposed)

- Proposed when Power Forward was still on the table
- Defined three scenarios







PARSG Project Review: 12/3/2020



Robert Cox and Beth Schrader

December 3, 2020

Understanding Resilience


- Reliability:
 - Associated with everyday operation of the grid
 - Well defined metrics exist
- Resiliency:
 - Associated with major events (i.e. hurricanes, ice storms, etc.)

Jurisdiction	Date Range	Without MEDs		With MEDs	
	•	SAIFI	SAIDI	SAIFI	SAIDI
South Carolina Duke	12 Months Ending	1.23	241	1.77	654
Energy Carolinas	3/31/19				
South Carolina Duke	12 Months Ending	1.30	143	2.41	1,479
Energy Progress	3/31/19				



Understanding Resilience


- 'Resilience' means the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.
- Resilience is contextual: Defined in terms of threats or hazards
 - Resilient to hurricane may not be resilient to earthquake
- Hazards have low probability but potential for high consequence






But Electric Power Can't Be Considered in Isolation...

- Electric power is foundational to so many of the services that a community requires
- Resilience thus requires looking beyond simply the grid, but what the grid enables
- Utilities and communities/governments may see resilience differently







Issues Framing the Analysis




Customers Affected during Hurricane Matthew in New Hanover County













This is clearly beneficial, and can be summarized in several potential metrics






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









The Interdependencies in Our Systems






But What About Backup Diesel?





The Bottom Line

- Electric power is the lifeblood of our society, including the function of the economy after an event
- Resilience analysis must include an understanding of this impact






Resilience Analysis Process

- First proposed as part of the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review
- Walks through defining:
 - Hazards
 - Consequences
 - Goals






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




Example: City of New Orleans

- City concerned about providing citizens with access to infrastructure services as quickly as possible
- Process:
 - What is the worst-case storm event likely to hit the city?
 - How did the city perform in past cases similar to the worst-case scenario?
 - Deploy grid modernization solutions to ensure sustained and equitable access to services provided by the grid








Example: City of New Orleans

- Goal: Provide sustained and equitable access to key services
- Metric: % of infrastructure assets with reliable backup power for at least 7 days, and 12-14 if costs allow






Example: City of New Orleans



Identify "resilience nodes"



Percentage of Total Infrastructure Supported by Resilience Nodes, All Zones





Our Analysis Approach

 Our project focuses on historic analysis looking at impact of recent storms on DEC and DEP





Duke Data

- DEC & DEP outage information, with a focus on MEDs
 - From 2015-2018
- Extensive information about GIP programs impacting New Hanover County
 - Self-Optimizing Grid
 - Targeted Undergrounding
- Feeder models for New Hanover County
- Understanding of transmission vs. distribution outages in major events



How Does This Impact North Carolina

- North Carolina has a complex patchwork of models for power delivery:
 - IOUs
 - Munis
 - Co-ops
- To begin to understand this, we started with New Hanover County, the largest urban area in the state with significant hurricane threats



Stakeholder Process

- Direct conversations with stakeholders in the region
 - City of Wilmington
 - Office of Emergency Management (New Hanover County)
 - CFPUA
 - UNC Wilmington
 - Local school district
 - Hospital system



What Do We Hear in Stakeholder Conversations?

- From City and County staff: Extremely impressed with response from Duke Energy during Florence
- CFPUA:
 - Southside Plant: Released 5.25 million gallons of partially treated wastewater
 - Difficulty getting diesel to other locations nearly resulted in loss of potable water
- Emergency Management:
 - Fuel could not be delivered; Fuel contract needed to be developed during the storm
 - Shelters were overwhelmed
- UNCW
 - Significant loss of refrigerated food and research
 - Unable to provide support to surrounding community
- Community:
 - A number of comments have reflected a *perception* of inequity in the restoration




Outcomes

- Emergency response and management is particularly difficult
- Can sites be identified throughout the County at which power can be provided in the immediate aftermath of the storm?
- What role can grid modernization efforts play and to what extent does a microgrid or other solution become the necessary solution?




Key Areas Where Community Function is Essential




EPIC

Understanding Community Challenges





Understanding Community Challenges





Potential Locations

- Northside
 - Local Church: Last mile point-of-distribution center; can allow community WiFi access for applications
- Southside
 - Local Church: Point of distribution, mass feeding
 - Community center: Point of distribution, mass feeding
 - Shopping center with grocery store and pharmacy: Located near public housing developments. Located in area where residents are less mobile.



Potential Locations

- Castle Hayne:
 - Shopping center with grocery store and pharmacy: Serves a rural community
- Carolina Beach / Kure Beach:
 - Shopping center with grocery store, pharmacy, library: Serves a community that tends to be isolated during storms



What Next?

- How can we create metrics to evaluate potential solutions that meet these goals?
- Understand history of power outages in these regions



Example Community Metrics

- Number of critical assets without power for more than *N* hours in a given region (# of assets)
 - N may be set as 0 hours or greater than the number of hours back up fuel is available
- Type of critical assets without power (hospital, fire station, police station, evacuation shelters, community food supply distribution center, production facility, military sites)
- Critical asset energy demand not served (cumulative kWh)
- Critical asset time to recovery (Average hrs)





Breakout Session Overview



Robert Cox December 3, 2020

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
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The Interdependencies in Our Systems





The Dimensions of Resilience

POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS Composition, Distribution, Socio-Economic status, etc. ENVIRONMENTAL/ECOSYSTEM Air quality, Soil, Biomass, Biodiversity, etc. **ORGANIZED GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES** Legal and security services. Health services, etc. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Facilities, Lifelines, etc. IFESTYLE AND COMMUNITY COMPETENCE Quality of Life, etc. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Financial, Production, Employment distribution, etc. SOCIAL-CULTURAL CAPITAL Education services, Child and elderly care services, etc.



Our Approach

Dimension	Community Vulnerability	Power System Vulnerability
Population and Demographics	 What is the social vulnerability of the population, and how does this impact your response to disasters? 	 Are there large demographic groups that remain after storms that need power for essential services? For example, shelters, child care, etc.
	 Are there vulnerabilities <pre>associated with the ability of your population to bounce back? For example, historically disenfranchised groups can be more negatively impacted by disasters because of a more general feeling of hopelessness.</pre> 	2. Will a loss of power impact your ability to provide medical services, or will restoration exacerbate demographic issues?
Environmental and Ecosystem	 Are there particular threats to the environment that impact your community (i.e. threats to agriculture from storms, wastewater runoff, etc.) 	 Is there a strong relationship between power and the ability to protect the environment (i.e. wastewater treatment facilities). Are there vulnerabilities to providing diesel for backup at key locations?



Our Approach

Organized Governmental Services	1)	Are there vulnerabilities to your ability to provide emergency services following a disaster?	1)	Is there a specific concern about getting diesel for back up generators, for instance? Do you not have adequate backup?
	2)	Are there vulnerabilities associated with services such as medical treatment, social services, elderly care, etc.?	2)	How does a loss of electric power impact essential social services?
Physical Infrastructure	1)	Are there particular infrastructure vulnerabilities that your community faces (i.e. impacts from flooded roads, limited redundancy in electric power infrastructure, etc.)	1)	Are there specific threats to your power infrastructure or your ability to get fuel for long periods?
Economic Activity	1)	Are there specific vulnerabilities to your economy, i.e. do you have a high dependence on	1)	Without electric power, is your economy threatened in some way?



Our Approach

- Quick introduction
- Quick introduction:
 - Name
 - Organization
 - Resilience dimension most important to you
- Deep dive on the top 3 dimensions

